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INTRODUCTION
Young Americans are starting their adult lives with chains around
their necks. 1 Increasingly, they feel penalized for getting an education. 2
I borrowed 42K, and I now owe double . . . I feel like this is NEVER
going to end. I can’t afford to buy a house; I have excellent credit,

_________________________________
1. Mario Parra Sr., Real Student Debt Stories, Student Debt Crisis: Real Student
Debt Stories (Aug. 11, 2017), http://studentdebtcrisis.org/read-student-debt-stories/
(entries are listed chronologically descending from the most recent post).
2. Shayne, Real Student Debt Stories, Student Debt Crisis: Real Student Debt
Stories (Aug. 31, 2017), http://studentdebtcrisis.org/read-student-debt-stories/.
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but my debt to income ratio is so disproportionate that I cannot get a
loan. 3
I graduated in 2007 with a 3yr BFA degree and now owe 180,191+.
This will never be paid off. It rises every day. I’m an American
citizen that has been penalized for getting an education that should
have bettered my situation. Not garnished my wages and my life. 4
To see the young starting their adult life with a chain around their
necks. Never in our past history has that been the case. How is it
possible that instead of making it easier we are making it more
difficult for them to succeed? 5

These general feelings of hopelessness will be exacerbated by President
Trump’s plan to end the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program
(“PSLF”) in an effort to take even more away from the unfortunate
indebted student. 6 PSLF forgives the outstanding balance on a federal
loan when the student has made 120 qualifying monthly payments
under a repayment plan while working for an eligible employer. 7 This
program is one of few available to students with federal loans, enabling
students to escape the indentured servitude of student loan repayment
after making a significant and good faith effort at to repay. 8
Unfortunately, for the majority of students today, cheap or free
higher education is an unattainable fairy-tale of the past. 9 It is a pay to
play system; unless a student has money or scholarships, he must obtain
student loans if he desires a college and/or graduate level education.
_________________________________
3. Ashley Biggs, Real Student Debt Stories, Student Debt Crisis: Real Student
Debt Stories (Sept. 30, 2017), http://studentdebtcrisis.org/read-student-debt-stories/.
4. Shayne, supra note 2.
5. Parra Sr., supra note 1.
6. See id.; see also Zack Friedman, Trump May End Public Service Student Loan
Forgiveness, FORBES (May 18, 2017, 8:02 AM) [hereinafter Trump May End],
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/05/18/trump-public-servicestudent-loan-forgiveness/#55eda6ee1eb8.
7. Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Fed. Student Aid: An Off. of the U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/ publicservice (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
8. Id.
9. Carolyn Maloney, The Student Debt Crisis Solution, Politico (Oct. 4, 2015)
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/the-answer-to-the-student-loandebt-crisis-213217.
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Economists have expressed that this new education system is affecting
the economy in a harmful manner. 10 Americans are still paying off their
student loans well into their 30s, 40s, and 50s, instead of buying homes,
investing, or starting businesses. 11 As of February 2017, the national
student debt was the highest it had ever been—at a whopping $1.3
trillion total—with 44.2 million borrowers, and an average borrower
graduating with $37,172 in student loan debt. 12 The debt reached $1.4
trillion during that same year. 13 With student loan debt accelerating and
compounding at such a high rate, a repeat of the 2008 Mortgage Crisis
may not be so distant. To avoid another economic disaster, the student
loan debt crisis must be addressed before it is too late.
Not only is the government considering the removal of PSLF and
other beneficial programs for students, but currently, student loans are
virtually non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. 14 Bankruptcy used to be a
viable option for unfortunate student loan debtors until Congress
enacted 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), which made student loans virtually nondischargeable overnight. 15 Although not entirely immune to
bankruptcy, the amendment required student loan debtors to establish
that repaying the loan would cause an “undue hardship” on the student
to be absolved of liability. 16 However, Congress left “undue hardship”
open to interpretation by the courts. Now, almost thirty years after the
enactment of § 523(a)(8), circuit splits have emerged with majority
views, minority views, and super minority views concerning the “undue
hardship” test. The bankruptcy code requires consistency, but a strict
test making the discharge of these loans impossible will not suffice.
_________________________________
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Zach Friedman, Student Loan Debt in 2017: A $1.3 Trillion Crisis, Forbes
(Feb. 21, 2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/
02/21/student-loan-debt-statistics-2017/#651347ed5dab Student; Household Debt:
Changes in Types of Borrowers and Debt, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/press/pressbriefings/household-borrowing-studentloans-homeownership (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
13. Bill Fay, Students & Debt: More on Students, DEBT.ORG,
https://www.debt.org/students/ (last visited May 17, 2018) [hereinafter Students &
Debt].
14. Trump May End, supra note 6; see also infra Part III.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
16. See infra Part III, IV.
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Fortunately, it is not too late for Congress to reconsider student loan
discharge. The debt trend shows that the national student loan debt will
only continue to increase and the midnight hour is approaching.
This comment suggests that the answer to the student loan crisis is
a combination of congressional reform and judicial persistence.
Overturning 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is the most effective way to hold
student loan lenders accountable for their predatory and unethical
practices, while at the same time preventing economic collapse in the
future. Meanwhile, the judiciary must consistently adjudicate these
ongoing student loan issues. This comment will not focus on an indepth economic analysis of the 2008 Mortgage Crisis and the current
student loan situation. Instead, it will compare the similarities and
differences between the 2008 disaster and the impending student loan
crisis. Part II will illuminate the history and evolution of student loans
and the rising cost of education. 17 Part III will explain how Congress
virtually abolished student loan dischargeability in bankruptcy and
enabled lenders to lend predatorily and without risk. 18 Part IV will then
survey the statutes and case law surrounding the current and convoluted
status of student loan dischargeability in bankruptcy. 19 Part V will
introduce the student loan crisis and compare the existing student loan
situation with what happened in 2008. 20 Finally, Part VI will propose
congressional and judicial solutions to fixing not just the student loan
problem, but the educational system as well. 21
II. EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN
This may be hard for some to fathom, but education used to be free.
Not until the 1990s were student loans even necessary for higher
education. 22 Federal loans were first introduced in the late 1950s when
America entered the “Space Race” with Russia and the rest of the

_________________________________
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part VI.
22. BILL ZIMMERMAN, THE STUDENT LOAN SWINDLE: WHY IT HAPPENED –
WHO’S TO BLAME – HOW THE VICTIMS CAN BE SAVED 281–91 (2014) (ebook).
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world. 23 President Dwight Eisenhower’s focus on scientific expansion
and research led to the enactment of the National Defense Education
Act of 1958, which authorized direct loans to student borrowers,
backed by the United States Treasury. 24 These low interest loans made
it easier for public universities to grow as they now had funding from
both the government and students. 25 However, only a small group of
public and private universities received close to 80 percent of the
funding allotted. 26 Thus, Lyndon B. Johnson enacted the Higher
Education Act of 1965 “to bring better education to millions of
disadvantaged youth who need it most” and “to put the best educational
equipment and ideas and innovations within the reach of all students.”27
First, the federal government guaranteed student loans provided by
private bankers and non-profit lenders, forming a program now entitled
the Federal Family Education Loan Program (“FFELP”). 28 Economists
and politicians disagreed considerably over whether the loans should be
direct or guaranteed. 29 Interestingly, the 1965 budget rules required a
loss when loans were made directly rather than when loans were
guaranteed. 30 Therefore, it was a win-win for Johnson’s budget—there
was no immediate loss, and more students were able to attend college.
However, economists were concerned that the government was making
financial decisions without assessing the future risks and costs that

_________________________________
23. Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It’s Free!: The Evolution of
Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy and the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in Hedlund v.
Educational Resources Institute Inc., 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 69 (2015).
24. Id. (citing National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72
Stat. 1580 (1958) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C.)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at n.25 (explaining that this small group consisted of merely twenty
universities).
27. Id. (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: Toward
Full Educational Opportunity, The Am. Presidency Project (Jan. 12, 1965),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27448).
28. Education Policy: Student Loan History, NEW AM., https://www.new
america.org/education-policy/policy-explainers/higher-ed-workforce/federalstudent-aid/federal-student-loans/federal-student-loan-history (last visited Mar. 22,
2018).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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come with potential defaults, administrative costs, and interest
subsidies. 31
The economists’ prayers were answered in 1990 when President
George H.W. Bush signed the Federal Credit Reform Act. 32 This Act
required that all loans include an estimated “subsidy cost;” the
government would need to set aside money to cover the costs associated
with each loan. 33 This more logical approach to budgeting brought new
policy to Capitol Hill and as soon as 1992, the government began
leaning away from guaranteed backed loans and toward direct loans. 34
An analysis from the Bush administration indicated that direct loans
would deliver loans at a significantly lower cost to taxpayers because
private banks no longer served as middlemen, and the government was
freed from paying private lender fees and cost subsidies. 35 However,
until 2010, roughly 73 percent of all student loan borrowers continued
to choose lending through the guaranteed loans of FFELP, partly due to
the aggressive marketing tactics used by the private banks. 36 Congress
then passed The Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010,
which eliminated FFELP and made all federally-backed loans under the
direct loan program mandatory. 37 Although FFELP loans were
discontinued, private education loans were still authorized; the federal
government simply refrained from guaranteeing them. 38
As student loans were evolving, college was becoming more
expensive. Beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s, college tuition
increased as many states developed large budget-deficits. 39 With
popular support for tax-reducing measures, state welfare and poverty
programs were first put on the chopping block, followed by other public
services. 40 Soon after, state funding to public universities was
dramatically reduced and the universities had no choice but to raise
_________________________________
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Keeton, supra note 23, at 73.
See id.
See id.
Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 295.
Id.
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tuition.41 State cuts to education have further accelerated in the recent
years. For example, California’s public university tuition increased
more than 70 percent between 2007 and 2012. 42 To keep their elite
status and take advantage of the ever-growing need for a college degree,
private institutions also increased their tuition. 43
Over the last twenty years, there has been a tectonic shift in how
America views education. 44 The burden to educate the public was
initially on the state government, but now, the expense is transferred to
the student because states and universities can get away with it. 45 This
was the perfect profit opportunity for Wall Street; 46 loans were
guaranteed, college was expensive, and the market for a college degree
was flourishing. 47 With the increasing cost of education, lenders
recognized the huge profit potential. 48 When students repaid loans—as
opposed to the government—banks could retain their fees and
interest. 49 However, when students defaulted, the guarantees kicked in
and the government would paid the remaining loan balance to the
banks, as well as late fees and any accumulated penalties. 50 It was a
win-win for the lenders and there was seemingly no risk to student loan
lending.
III. STUDENT LOANS AND BANKRUPTCY
If risk-free lending was not enough for the banks, students took the
largest blow when their only escape route was taken away: the right to
discharge federally backed student loans in bankruptcy. 51 This was the
_________________________________
41. Id. at 300.
42. Id. at 320–25
43. Id. at 325.
44. See id. at 310, 325.
45. Id.
46. See generally id. at 365–74.
47. See id. at 365–80.
48. Id. at 374.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. G. Michael Bedinger VI, Note, Time for a Fresh Look at the “Undue
Hardship” Bankruptcy Standard for Student Debtors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1817, 1821
(2014) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).
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first time the government wholly singled out a specific class of loan. 52
In 1998, Congress repealed and replaced 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) with
statutory language that allowed students to discharge their loans only
when repaying such loans would cause an “undue hardship.” 53 The
“undue hardship” test was not a novel concept relating to the
dischargeability of student loans in 1998. 54 The test was enacted in
1976. 55 In the late 1970s Congress was alarmed when it heard rumors
of medical and legal professionals abusing the bankruptcy system and
discharging massive debt before entering their practices. 56 At that time,
the U.S. Trustee Program (the organization now responsible for
policing and enforcing the integrity of the bankruptcy code) did not
exist.57 Congress decided to address the abuse of student loan
dischargeability by requiring debtors to wait five years before they
could discharge the loan or prove to the court that making payments
toward the student loan was causing an “undue hardship.” 58 This five
year waiting requirement forced many doctors and other professionals
with graduate student loan debt to attempt a “good faith” effort to pay
their debts. Ironically, this push for regulation was based on practically
no statistical evidence. 59
_________________________________
52. Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 398.
53. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. 105-244, § 971, 112
Stat. 1581, 1837 (striking the other option for student debt relief following a specified
time period) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)).
54. As of 1998, the “undue hardship” test was not a novel concept because
Congress had previously inserted this language into legislation. See Education
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-482, § 439, 90 Stat. 2081 (1976) (codified as 20
U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)) (repealed 1978).
55. Id. (providing how a loan could only be discharged prior to a five-year
waiting period if payment would “impose an undue hardship on the debtor or his
dependents.”).
56. See Frank T. Bayuk, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue
Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004).
57. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, §§ 101 et seq., 586,
92 Stat. 2549, 2549–54, 2663–64 (1978) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 586
(2012) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2012)); About the U.S. Trustee Program, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/ust (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
58. Bayuk, supra note 56, at 1094–95.
59. Id. (“Rather, it justified the proposal on the belief that even a small number
of ‘abuses’ discredit the system and cause disrespect for the law and those charged
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The difference between the 1976 legislation and the 1998
legislation was that the 1976 legislation provided a student with two
routes to discharge student loans in bankruptcy. 60 Students could either
wait five years from the time payment on the loan commenced, or they
could qualify under the “undue hardship” analysis. 61 Post 1998, only
the “undue hardship” route existed and it was subject to court
interpretation. 62 The last nail was hammered into the student loan
dischargeability coffin in 2005 when Congress amended the statutory
definition of student loan to a “qualified educational loan,” aligning it
with the broad definition of the Internal Revenue Code § 221(d)(1). 63
With this new broad definition and assuming that a student could not
pass the “undue hardship” standard, all student loans were now nondischargeable if they were “incurred by the taxpayer solely to pay
qualified higher education expenses . . . .” 64 Consequently, private
lenders who did not participate in FFELP were also able to join the club
when it came to non-risk lending.
IV. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP TESTS
Section 523 of the United States Code references many types of
debts that are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. 65 The prominent policy
behind bankruptcy is “to discharge certain debts to give an honest
individual debtor a ‘fresh start.’” 66 With the use of the words “certain
_________________________________
with its administration.’”); COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT ON
BANKRUPTCY LAWS, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. I, at 11, 170, 176–77 (1973).
60. See Bayuk, supra note 56, at 1095–96.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8)(B) (2012)).
64. I.R.C. § 221(d)(1) (Supp. 2000).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012).
66. Chapter 7 Eligibility, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited May 17,
2018) [hereinafter Chapter 7]; see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)
(“The federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to distribute the property of
the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a main
purpose of the act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in
life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after the property which he owned
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debts,” it is clear that Congress intended that all debts not be created
equally. 67 “Congress created these exceptions to the general rule of
dischargeability on the ground that ‘the creditors’’ interest in
recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the
debtors’ interest in a fresh start.” 68 Even though the amendment to §
523(a)(8) is highly discouraging, Congress did not place student loans
on the same non-dischargeable platform as other non-dischargeable
debts. 69 There is a back door for student loan dischargeability, which is
the “undue hardship” test. 70 Unfortunately for students, it is up to the
courts to interpret the meaning of “undue hardship” and to this day the
Supreme Court has refused to put it to rest. 71 Currently, 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8) states:
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents, for—
(A)(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution; or (ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or

_________________________________
at the time of bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of creditors. Our
decisions lay great stress upon this feature of the law—as one not only of private but
of great public interest in that it secures to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his
property for distribution, a new opportunity in life.”).
67. See generally Chapter 7, supra note 64.
68. Hiatt v. Ind. State Student Assistance Comm’n, 36 F.3d 21, 24 (7th Cir.
1994) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Taxes, government fines and penalties, money
obtained by fraud, and willful and malicious injury are just some of the completely
non-dischargeable debts listed).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
71. See Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 794 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2015)
(where the Seventh Circuit held that the debtor’s student loans were not dischargeable
because the debtor did not have an “undue hardship” under the Brunner Test), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 803 (2016).
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(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
incurred by a debtor who is an individual . . . . 72

Because the legislature left “undue hardship” undefined, many circuit
courts began to define the meaning for themselves. 73
A. The Johnson Test
A notable approach to interpreting the meaning of undue hardship
occurred in In re Johnson. 74 There, the court established that for a
debtor or bankrupt person to have an “undue hardship” they must pass
the three-prong Johnson test: the “mechanical test,” the good faith test,
and the policy test. 75 The “mechanical test” asked whether the debtor’s
foreseeable income would allow the debtor to pay the student loan while
also paying any expenses associated with staying above the minimum
poverty line including supporting any dependents. 76 If answered in the
negative, the court would proceed to the second prong, the good faith
test. 77 If answered in the affirmative, the court would deny the
discharge. 78 Once the debtor passed the “mechanical test,” the court
would then apply the good faith test, asking whether the debtor was
irresponsible or negligent in minimizing expenditures, securing
employment, or maximizing resources. 79 If no negligence or
irresponsibility was found, the debtor was entitled to discharge. 80 If the
answer was yes—and such irresponsibility or negligence would have
changed the answer of the “mechanical test”—a presumption to deny
discharge was created; a negative answer to the policy test, however,
_________________________________
72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
73. See infra Part VI Sections A–C.
74. See generally Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re
Johnson), No. 77-2033, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428, at *21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June
27,1979).
75. Id. at *59–60.
76. Id. at *60.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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could rebut this presumption. 81 The policy test required that the debtor’s
“circumstances,” meaning “the amount and percentage of total
indebtedness of the student loan and the employment prospects of the
petitioner, indicate” whether the primary reason for the bankruptcy was
to discharge the student loan, or whether the debtor has benefited
financially from obtaining the loan. 82 In other words, the policy test
determined whether the debtor had financially bettered himself because
of the student loan or was simply trying to rid himself of the obligation
to pay it back. If the answer was affirmative to either question, a
discharge would be denied. 83 If answered in the negative, a discharge
would be granted. 84 Because this test is confusing and complicated,
other courts have rejected it and moved on to a more objective and
simplistic approach. 85
B. The Bryant Test
Almost a decade after the Johnson court first set the standard for
“undue hardship,” the same Pennsylvania court searched for a simpler
approach to the issue in In re Bryant. 86 Here, unlike the test in Johnson,
the court objectively focused on the federal poverty line and whether
the debtor’s income was above or below that threshold. 87 If the debtor’s
income was below the poverty line, a discharge would be appropriate.
Again, this rationale was based on Congress’ intent to prevent abuse
and inequitable situations from occurring; thus, the court alluded that
low-income individuals are not abusing the system. 88 If the debtor’s
income was above the federal poverty line, a presumption of abuse
would arise and the debtor would receive no discharge unless he or she
could show “unique” or “extraordinary” circumstances. 89 By
_________________________________
81. Id.
82. Id. at *60–61.
83. Id. at *61.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72
B.R. 913, 915 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
86. Id. at 915, 915 n.2.
87. Id. at 915.
88. See id. at 917 (“It is quite apparent that such ‘abuses’ are not unchecked by
allowing discharges to persons whose income is at or below the poverty guidelines.”).
89. Id. at 917.
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simplifying the Johnson test down to one step, the court’s idea was to
provide a more objective approach to defining “undue hardship.”90
Unfortunately, this test only survived six months before the Second
Circuit adopted a new test. 91
C. The Brunner Test
The Second Circuit’s Brunner test, derived from In re Brunner, has
been accepted in some fashion as the leading majority standard in the
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 92 In
Brunner, the debtor filed for bankruptcy after receiving her Master’s
degree in social work. 93 At the time of filing, the debtor was
unemployed, on food stamps, and seeking treatment for anxiety. 94 The
debtor testified that her anxiety was partly due to her inability to gain
employment in her field of study after sending out over one hundred
resumes in pursuit of a job. 95 Two months after filing her petition, the
debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking to discharge her student
loans. 96 The New York bankruptcy court found that employment in her
field was limited and her current income would not allow her to repay
her student loans without “undue hardship.” 97 In reversing the
bankruptcy court’s ruling, the district court explained that 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8), “commits the student to repayment regardless of his or her
subsequent economic circumstances.” 98 In obtaining a discharge of
student loans in bankruptcy prior to five years after they first came due,
the court required a three-part showing:
_________________________________
90. Id. at 915; see also Keeton, supra note 23, at 80.
91. Keeton, supra note 23, at 80; see generally Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher
Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
92. B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time
Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 111–12 (2002).
93. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 46 B.R. 752, 753 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 757.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 753.
97. Id. at 757.
98. Id. at 756.
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1) that the debtor cannot, based on current income and expenses,
maintain a “minimal” standard of living for himself or herself and
his or her dependents if forced to repay the loans, 2) that this state of
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period of the student loan, and 3) that the debtor has made good faith
efforts to repay the loans. 99

On appeal to the district court, the bankruptcy court’s judgment was
reversed and the court found that the debtor had not sufficiently
established the second and third elements of the test. 100 The court
placed a focus on the debtor’s ability to pay her student loans in the
future and noted that nothing in the record supported a finding that the
debtor maintained an inability to pay or find work for any significant
time. 101 The court first noted that the debtor was capable of at least some
type of work and had no dependents at the time of her bankruptcy
filing. 102 Although the debtor testified that she was consulting a
therapist about her anxiety in relation to her unemployment, “there was
no evidence in the record that her depression and anxiety impaired her
capacity to work.” 103 Secondly, the court alluded that the debtor had not
adequately demonstrated to the court that her filing was in good faith. 104
The debtor filed for bankruptcy within one month of the date that her
first student loan payment was due. 105 Nor had the debtor even
attempted to seek out bankruptcy alternatives, such as deferred
payment. 106 As such, the debtor did not meet the last two elements of
the test and she was not entitled to discharge. 107

_________________________________
99. Id.
100. Id. at 758.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 757.
104. See id. at 758; see also Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 854
(9th Cir. 2013) (discussing how interpretation of the “good faith” requirement
ultimately rests with the appellate courts under the clearly erroneous standard of
review).
105. Brunner, 46 B.R. at 758.
106. Id.
107. See id.
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V. THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS
Today and since the beginning of time, misconceptions have
roamed the minds of individuals everywhere. From the early days of
Ptolemy and the “geocentric” theory that the earth was the center of the
universe to the Renaissance and the belief that Christopher Columbus
discovered America (Christopher Columbus did not discover North
America first 108), it is clear that misconceptions are still prevalent.
Luckily, these misconceptions were innocuous because those beliefs
were later corrected with new information. But what happens when a
misconception is capable of producing dire consequences to the
masses? The most recent example of this situation appeared in 2008,
known as the 2008 Mortgage Crisis or Great Recession. The bursting
of the mortgage bubble started with the misconception that housing
prices would continue to increase indefinitely. 109 From the 1940s to the
2000s, housing prices had increased over 390 percent. 110 This
misconception did not solely affect buyers looking to get in on a “safe
investment” either—subprime mortgage lenders alike were stern
believers. 111 Subprime mortgage lending dealt with originating loans to
individuals who normally and traditionally have lower credit scores and
who do not have the recommended amount of cash collateral available
to enter into a traditional loan. 112 For instance, individuals with a high
debt to income ratio and poor credit were given mortgages that they
normally would not be able to receive from other lenders in exchange
for much higher interest rates. 113 Another tradeoff for homeowners was
_________________________________
108. Eric Weiner, Coming to America: Who Was First?, Nat’l Pub. Radio
(Oct. 8, 2007, 2:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=15040888.
109. Andrew Woodman, Note, The Student Loan Bubble: How the Mortgage
Crisis Can Inform the Bankruptcy Courts, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 179, 181–82 (2013).
110. Id. at 182 (explaining that during this time period, “[t]he median home
value in the United States quadrupled from $30,600 to $119,600.”).
111. See id. (citing Greg Ip, Housing Prices Always Rise, Wash. Post (Dec. 20,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worstideas/housing-bubble.html).
112. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
113. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2018

15

California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 2, Art. 5
Sexton camera ready (Do Not Delete)

338

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

7/16/2018 11:52 AM

[Vol. 54

that most of these subprime loans were structured as Adjustable Rate
Mortgages (ARMs) that would initially start with lower payments, but
in turn would increase significantly over the years forcing the
homeowner to either refinance or be foreclosed upon when they could
no longer afford the payments. 114 The subprime lenders had nothing to
lose because the loans were secured by real properties with values
increasing annually. 115 Even if the homeowners defaulted, the banks
were protected by foreclosure. This misconception was discredited in
2007 when there was a rapid decrease in housing prices, which caused
widespread panic. 116 In 2008, together with the subprime mortgage
loans and the plunge in housing prices, one out of every twenty
homeowners was in default, leaving foreclosure as the only viable
option. 117
Wall Street was in a panic. Many mortgage-backed securities
(“MBS’s”) instantly became “toxic” assets overnight. 118 MBS’s
consisted of a compilation of mortgages that were packaged up and sold
to investors for trade on the open market. 119 When the collateral (the
homes) that secured the mortgages became under secured 120 due to the
price fall and with the combination of one in every twenty homeowners
defaulting, MBS’s lost value immediately and investment firms
imploded in what we know now as the 2008 Mortgage Crisis. 121
A similar student loan bubble has the potential to be an even larger
problem and requires attention before America suffers the same crisis
it suffered in 2008. Unlike the Mortgage Crisis, not one misconception
is involved, but two. 122 The first misconception is that obtaining a
college degree will always be economically viable, and the second is
that student loans are low-risk investments and non-dischargeable in
_________________________________
114. Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88
IND. L.J. 213, 227 n.58 (2013).
115. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 182.
116. Jamie P. Hopkins & Katherine A. Pustizzi, A Blast From The Past: Are the
Robo-Signing Issues that Plagued the Mortgage Crisis Set to Engulf the Student Loan
Industry?, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 239, 241 (2014).
117. See id. at 243–44.
118. Id. at 241.
119. Simkovic, supra note 114, at 214.
120. Meaning the value of the home dropped to less than that of the mortgage.
121. Id.
122. See generally Woodman, supra note 109, at 183.
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bankruptcy. 123 Traditionally in America, a college degree increased
earning potential when compared to individuals lacking a college
degree. 124 From 1976 to 1999, a college graduate’s salary was 1.8 times
more than the salary of a high school graduate. 125 The increase rose to
50 percent more when a graduate degree was pursued. 126 On average,
these increases acted similarly across genders and race, and education
was in fact, considered as a whole, a worthy investment. 127 Compiling
the value of a college degree with the availability of college through
student loans, bachelor degree awards have exploded. 128 From 1988 to
2011, there was a 72 percent increase in bachelor degrees awarded and
the numbers continue to rise. 129 For instance, in the 2015–16 graduating
year there were 2,894,987 graduates, which equated to a 170 percent
increase from 2011 and a 290 percent increase from 1988. 130 The 2015–
16 graduating statistics are slightly lower than those of the prior year,
which counted graduates at 2,915,251, but I would not declare a plateau
just yet. 131 These statistics only account for students who complete their
education in an undergraduate degree program. 132 However, they do not
account for the students who enter college or graduate degree programs,
nor for students who leave or drop out with student loan debt. 133
Naturally, with more students entering and completing college,
there is a rising national student debt. This can be seen when looking at
1999’s cumulative student loan debt of just $92 billion and comparing
it to today’s student loan debt of about $1.4 trillion, which is a near
1000 percent increase. 134 How can the number of graduating students
rise only 290 percent, while outstanding student loan debt rises to 1500
_________________________________
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra Part II.
129. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 184.
130. See Christian Tizon, Undergraduate Degree Earners Report, 2015-16,
Nat’l Student Clearinghouse Res. Ctr., fig.1 (2017), https://nscresearchcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/UndergradDegreeEarnersRpt-2015-16.pdf.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 188; Students & Debt, supra note 13.
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percent? What is causing this grossly disproportionate ratio of
graduating students to student loan debt? Inflation is certainly one
factor (as graduating students are individuals who do not adjust for
inflation), but the true cause is the government—enabling bankers,
investors, and students into activities believed to have no
consequences. 135 For the student, it is the promise that education is the
best investment and that students are guaranteed to repay their loans
later, but for investors and banks, it is that student loans are entirely low
risk assets that can be traded. 136
Advocates of change in the student loan industry focus on many of
the similarities between the circumstances leading up to the housing
crisis and what is currently happening with student loans. The first
similarity, briefly touched on above, is the eccentric idea that everyone
can own a home and that everyone should have a college education. 137
Ken Lin, the CEO of creditkarma.com, stated, “A college education is
a path to life success just like home ownership is a path to financial
stability. In reality, some people aren’t suited for it.” 138 The ideas that
both objectives are necessities and everyone should participate in
obtaining an education contributes to the bubble.
The second similarity is that interest rates played a large role in both
the 2008 mortgage collapse and the current student loan situation. 139
People can no longer pay their debts once interest rates spiral the debt
out of control. Although the interest rates appear to be low and
attractive, the ARM loans of the mortgage industry quickly became
unaffordable, just as a $30,000 student loan will turn into $50,000
within a matter of years. 140 But the most notable similarity is how both
industries focused on getting anyone and everyone approved for a loan.
In the mortgage industry, this was achieved through subprime mortgage
lenders, while in the student loan industry, it is even easier because the
government allows students to obtain government backed loans without
_________________________________
135. See supra Part II.
136. See generally Woodman, supra note 109, at 185; see supra Part II.
137. Sheryl Nance Nash, 5 Ways the Student Loan Bubble Mirrors the Housing
Crisis, THE FISCAL TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/
Articles/2012/10/25/5-Ways-the-Student-Loan-Bubble-Mirrors-the-Housing-Crisis.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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even a credit check. 141 This first started through FFELP and now occurs
under the direct loan avenues. 142
The policy decision to authorize loans without assessing the risk to
repay them has had a detrimental impact on the quality of our
educational system. Issues such as Trump University are popping up,
where private for-profit education institutions are taking advantage of
the student’s ability to obtain loans and using high-pressure sales tactics
on individuals who are just beginning their professional lives. 143 In
return, students are left with nothing to show for their expensive
investment. 144 And Trump University is not the only perpetrator; forprofits have begun a takeover in the student loan industry through
savvier and more effective marketing tactics. 145 For instance, from 2000
to 2014, the total student loan debt of students enrolled at for-profit
institutions grew from $39 billion to $229 billion. 146 Although
alarming, investors and politicians do not seem to fear the
consequences.
A primary reason bankers, investors, and politicians are able to
sleep at night might revolve around the overall size of the student loan
debt in comparison to the mortgage industry. Although student loan
debt has been consistently and considerably increasing over past
decades, $1.4 trillion remains a dwarf in comparison to the current
$8.94 trillion in mortgages. 147 While opponents to change suspect a
crash would still hurt the economy—and specifically, the industry of
higher education—they distinguish it from the mortgage crash. 148 But
_________________________________
141. Id.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See Michael Barbaro & Steve Eder, Former Trump University Workers
Call the School a ‘Lie’ and a ‘Scheme’ in Testimony, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/us/politics/donald-trump-university.html.
144. Id.
145. Gillian B. White, The Empty Promises of For-Profit Colleges, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/
the-failure-of-for-profit-colleges/405301/.
146. Id.
147. See Students & Debt, supra note 13; Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Quarterly
Report on Household Debt and Credit pmbl. (2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC_2018Q1.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Marc Prosser, 5 Reasons the Student Loan Crisis is Nothing like
the Mortgage Crisis, Forbes (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/marcprosser/2012/08/22/student-loan-crisis/#2054a6896c1c.
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distinguishing the crises does not equate to disregarding the issue of
student loans altogether. Even opponents believe that the student loan
industry is causing an economic strain as the availability of student
loans enable more loans, triggering college tuition to rise, thus
increasing student loan balances. 149 “If the level of student debt
continues to grow at its current rate, it could become a significant
economic drag, as the younger generations delay purchases that would
have otherwise fed economic growth.” 150
Like MBS’s, student loan asset backed securities (“SLABS”) have
now become heavily traded. 151 MBS’s are similar to SLABS because
they both start with a single student loan that is packaged with other
student loans and then traded on the free market. 152 However, the
difference between SLABS and MBS’s is critical. For one, SLABS are
completely unsecured. 153 The only thing securing SLABS is 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) non-dischargeable bankruptcy law. 154 Mortgages, on the
other hand, are at least secured by a piece of property. 155 When the
housing market collapsed, there was something to pursue even if the
value of the home had decreased significantly. The owner did not incur
a complete loss of the security. Conversely, if the SLABS market
crashes, there is nothing to go after and no home to foreclose on. While
creditors do have access to the courts for a creditor judgment, this
remedy still poses a risk—these debtors just finished college and may
have no assets at all, leaving nothing for creditors to collect.
V. PROPOSALS
Just as the Mortgage Crisis myth led to the 2008 crash, the myth
that student loans are non-dischargeable will contribute to the

_________________________________
149. See id.; see also supra Part II.
150. Prosser, supra note 148.
151. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 199.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 218.
154. Id. (citing Julie Swedback & Kelly Prettner, Discharge or No Discharge?
An Overview of Eighth Circuit Jurisprudence in Student Loan Discharge Cases, 36
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1679, 1681–83 n.16 (2010)).
155. See Woodman, supra note 109, at 183.
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industry’s demise. In 2011, Jason Iuliano 156 conducted a study of
student loan adversary proceedings in bankruptcy and reviewed how
many of those proceedings were successful in discharging student
loans. 157 The results were alarming. In 2007, 169,774 student loan
debtors filed for bankruptcy. 158 Of those 169,774, only 217 adversary
proceedings were filed seeking a student loan discharge. 159 Of those
217 proceedings, 51 received a full discharge, 30 received a partial
discharge, 25 received an administrative remedy, and 111 received no
remedy at all. 160 Why are only 0.00128 percent of student loan debtors
filing adversary proceedings when roughly 50 percent of all
proceedings filed receive some form of remedy? The study further
found no statistical difference in outcome between being represented
by an attorney and appearing pro se. 161 Iuliano’s study focused
primarily on three possible theories. First, lenders may be settling
outside of bankruptcy. 162 This theory is unlikely, because bankruptcy
courts can discharge federal student debt, which makes up the bulk of
total student loan debt as a whole. 163 Second, debtors may be turning to
administrative remedies such as the Income Contingent Repayment
Plan 164 or PSLF. Third, and the most likely theory, is student debtors in
bankruptcy believe in the myth that student loans are either nondischargeable or nearly impossible to discharge. 165 Since 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8) was enacted, the myth has circulated that student loan debtors
are having an extremely difficult time meeting the “undue hardship”
test. 166 “One article in The New York Times went so far as to contend
_________________________________
156. Jason Iuliano obtained the following credentials: J.D. Harvard Law School;
Ph.D. Student in Politics, Princeton University. Jason Iuliano, An Empirical
Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 495, 495 n.* (2012).
157. See generally id. at 499–501
158. Id. at 505.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 523.
162. See id. at 506.
163. See id. (explaining how “less than fifteen percent of borrowers have private
student loans . . . .”).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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that ‘[t]he cases are so harsh in measuring what an undue hardship is
that anybody who is working and maintaining any kind of home life has
very little chance of discharging these things in bankruptcy.’” 167
A. Congressional Proposals
If another Mortgage Crisis is to be prevented, action must be taken
sooner, rather than later. In the House of Representatives, the Discharge
of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017 was introduced by House
Member John Delaney on May 4, 2017. 168 The bill has not yet been
passed and remains in the first stage of the legislative process. 169 “This
bill amends the federal bankruptcy code to permit a borrower to
discharge in bankruptcy a nonprofit, government, or private student
loan, or an obligation to repay an educational benefit, scholarship, or
stipend.” 170
The only way to prevent another economic disaster is by going back
to our roots and making student loans dischargeable again. In pre-1998
bankruptcy laws, college degrees were offered based on supply and
demand. 171 Colleges needed to research the job market and adjust
curricula accordingly. Universities had “skin in the game.” It is only
logical that if students do not find jobs after school and begin paying
their loans, the loans will default, the bank will suffer losses, and
ultimately, the bank will not lend or at least be hesitant to lend to that
college or university in the future.
Loans were based on an analysis of risk versus benefit. This system
forced colleges to perform a risk analysis on the degrees offered and
_________________________________
167. Id. at 506–07; (quoting Jonathan D. Glater, That Student Loan, So Hard to
TIMES
(Aug.
23,
2008)
https://www.nytimes.com
Shake,
N.Y.
/2008/08/24/business/24loans.html).
168. Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 2366, 115th
Cong. § 1 (2017) [hereinafter DSLBA].
169. Id.; see also H.R. 2366 Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act of
2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2366 (last visited
May 18, 2018).
170. Summary H.R. 2366—115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2366 (May 18, 2018); see
generally DSLBA, supra note 168.
171. Pauly, Supply and Demand of College Degrees: 101, CHI.NOW: The C.
Scoop (July 25, 2016, 2:18 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/collegescoop/2016/07/supply-and-demand-of-college-degrees-101/.
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compete heavily. For-profit private schools like Trump University, that
took advantage of easy money, were almost entirely non-existent or
failed because they were unable to produce wage earning students.
Although FFELP—the current direct student loan system—and private
loans are based on good intentions, they have morphed into a weed that
is slowly killing the economy. By making student loans dischargeable,
banks and lenders will lose the secured status of their asset, be forced
to perform better risk assessments, and ultimately, lend less. Fewer
loans will result in more balanced tuition costs, because universities and
colleges will not be able to increase tuition without loan funds available.
In other words, colleges and universities will not be able to charge
students more for tuition simply because they can get away with it.
Colleges and universities will not be able to offer “basket weaving”
degrees that serve little to no value to a student upon graduating.
Congress has tried already to fix this issue.172 Most recently,
Illinois Senator Richard Durbin introduced the Fairness for Struggling
Students Act of 2013. 173 While similar to the recent Discharge Student
Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017, this bill was different because it
focused solely on discharging private student loans. 174 Although this
bill died in Congress, it appears that Democratic senators still feel that
student loans are an impending disaster and wish to fix it by introducing
a bill that covers not just private, but all student loans. 175
Opponents of this idea and of House bills alike, might argue that
introducing these bills will cause immediate damage to the economy. If
student loans become dischargeable, a very large portion of the $1.4
trillion debt may be discharged overnight leaving investors and banks
at a major loss. Ultimately, these losses would make their way to the
taxpayer because the majority of all student loans are now federally
direct 176 and if there is a default, the government pays the price. When
the government pays, the taxpayers are directly impacted. The last thing
America needs is a bailout of defaulting students.
_________________________________
172. See generally Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, S. 114, 113th
Cong. §§ 1–2 (2013).
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See DSLBA, supra note 168.
176. See supra Part II.
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What many policy makers and investors do not understand is that
for a full discharge to take effect under this new law, the debtor must
still pass muster under the normal “means test” requirement to qualify
for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. 177 The “means test” analyzes the debtor’s
financial situation for the past sixty months to the date of filing. 178 A
large part of this calculation is based on the debtor’s income. 179 If the
debtor’s income is over a certain threshold (which is adjusted for
dependents), the debtor will not qualify for Chapter 7 and be forced to
pursue Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. 180 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy forces the
debtor to pay a percentage of their overall unsecured debt over a period
of thirty-six to sixty months using their current disposable income.181
At the end of this time-frame, the debtor’s remaining unsecured debt is
discharged. 182 A Chapter 13 Bankruptcy may also be useful to debtors
seeking a discharge for their student loans considering Chapter 13 plans
would pay at least something back to the lenders. 183 Therefore, lenders
would not suffer a complete loss, but would be able to receive sixty
months of payments. However, this would defeat the purpose of the
original loan contract by enabling student debtors to trade what may
have been a fifteen to twenty-year loan repayment agreement to one of
five-years in duration. Alternatively, it would be wise for lenders to
push for ten-year Chapter 13 plans rather than five in student loan
circumstances.
If the Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act was passed,
investors and politicians should not worry about the economy
collapsing immediately because many student debtors would not
qualify for bankruptcy. Currently, any single debtor making above the
income threshold (which can range from $39,231 to $64,901 annually
depending on the state of residence) would not qualify for Chapter 7

_________________________________
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2012); see generally Means Testing, U.S. Dep’t
of Just., https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing (last updated Apr. 16, 2018).
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (2012).
179. See id.
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012).
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012).
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (a) (2012).
183. See id.
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Bankruptcy. 184 Only those below the income threshold would remain
eligible. But, for student debtors whose income is below the “means
test” threshold, it is a clear indication that the student loan education
system may have failed them, as with their investment. The current
“means test” law, paired with the good faith repayment requirement of
the pre-1998 bankruptcy laws would serve as a safeguard to prevent
students from abusing bankruptcy by using the law as an avenue to
discharge their loans when they have the means to pay them.
B. Judicial Proposals
The courtroom is another avenue where change is needed. The
Supreme Court of the United States has not yet granted certiorari for
any case concerning the “undue hardship” test. 185 This has created an
ambiguous definition of “undue hardship.” Depending on where a
student debtor resides, the Court’s interpretation of “undue hardship”
will determine whether or not the debtor qualifies for discharge in
bankruptcy. This nation needs consistency, considering that the national
student loan debt is spiraling out of control at an exponential rate. The
rumor is that judges are reconsidering the Brunner test and seeking
more adversary proceedings concerning the “undue hardship”
analysis. 186 Only 0.00128 percent of student debtors with student loan
debt actually filed adversary proceedings. 187 That number is simply too
low for individuals who are seeking a fresh start.
CONCLUSION
America’s view and treatment of education is at the root of the
education loan bubble. Americans must demand more than “basket
weaving” degrees that provide no future and fail to promote the
_________________________________
184. Means Testing: Census Bureau, IRS Data and Administrative Expenses
Multipliers, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing/20171101
(last updated Mar. 14, 2018).
185. Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.,136 S. Ct. 803 (2016) (The United
States Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari).
186. Tara Siegel Bernard, Judges Rebuke Limits on Wiping Out Student Loan
Debt, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/yourmoney/student-loans/judges-rebuke-limits-on-wiping-out-student-loan-debt.html.
187. See supra Part VI.
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American dream of home ownership. The catalyst for change must start
with Congress and the Judiciary, because student loan lenders are
secured through bankruptcy law. The myth that student loans are nondischargeable has become a misconception to the majority. This
ideology must change if we wish to avoid another economic crash and
desire to better the education of Americans. The weed must be cut
before it kills the tree. The last time our country faced a potential crash
of such magnitude, it did not just watch, but encouraged one of the
greatest mortgage collapses ever recorded.
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